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Benjamin Strong Jr.

Benjamin Strong Jr. gave no speeches and did not appear in public to wax
theoretically on the ways of economics and high finance. He was J.P. Morgan’s
workhorse, and he built his reputation and his fortune from the ground up.
Adeline Torrey Schenck married a railroader/small-farmer named Benjamin
Strong, and together they had four sons and a daughter. Her forceful personality befitted
Adeline, the daughter of a prominent Presbyterian writer, theologian, and minister, and
her four sons continued the tradition of prominence in their respective fields. The oldest
was a Princeton graduate who earned a Ph.D. from Columbia University and became a
professor of neurology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons. Her second son
became the vice president of the American Radiator Company and partner in the
engineering firm of Meyer, Strong, and Jones. Her youngest boy went on to a highly
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successful career in medicine and psychiatry after earning degrees from Princeton and the
College of Physicians and Surgeons.
Adeline’s third son Benjamin Jr., was left no choice but to forego college because
of a lack of financial stability in the family at the time of his high school graduation. Yet,
he went on to become the governor of the New York branch of the Federal Reserve and
one of the most powerful and influential men in the United States.1
In 1891, at the age of 18, Benjamin Strong left the family home in Montclair, New
York, to seek his fortune in finance. After being quickly fired from his first job for of all
things, poor penmanship, he entered the firm of Jessup, Patton and Company, which
became John Patton and Company, which became Cuyler, Morgan and Company (as in
J.P. Morgan). He started as a clerk, and by 1900 Strong was representing international
investors in real estate and securities ventures.
He left Cuyler, Morgan, and Company at twenty-six, to join the Atlantic Trust
Company, which in 1903, became the Metropolitan Trust Company. He married
Margaret LeBoutillier, started a family, and soon settled in the prominent New York City
suburb of Englewood, New Jersey. There, he and his wife entered the social circles of
their community, and Benjamin met a man who would alter the course of his life forever.
Henry P. Davidson was a neighbor of the Strong’s and in April, 1904, offered Strong a
job at the newly founded Bankers Trust Company, owned by J.P. Morgan.
Bankers Trust was an instant success. Known as a “banker’s bank,” it held the
reserves of banks and other trust companies as a correspondent for them, and often made
loans to those banks and others, so they could repair their reserve positions or strains on

1Lester

V. Chandler. Benjamin Strong, Central Banker (Washington D.C., 1958), 21-22.

4

their leverage. Bankers Trust wrote many of these types of loans when the panic of 1907
hit the industry.
Davidson appointed Strong to a committee to determine which institutions could be
saved after the panic, and which would be sacrificed. The committee answered to three
men; J.P. Morgan, George F. Baker, and James Stillman. J.P. Morgan trusted only
Benjamin Strong’s reports and adopted him as a key advisor. Morgan was merciless,
locking prominent bankers in his library and pocketing the key until they found a way to
aid the institutions he saw fit to rescue. Strong summarized these trying times later in life
as, “the endless incidents, some tragic, some humorous, many of them exciting or
depressing, which characterized those weeks of strain and anxiety.”2
Strong’s anxieties did not end at the workplace. In 1905, his wife Margaret bore
their fourth child. She was stricken with what could have only been post-partum
depression and other psychological ailments, and committed suicide. His friend and
neighbor, Henry Davidson, took the Strong children into his home, and Strong plunged
himself into work. Then, in 1907, at the age of thirty-five, he married the twenty year old
Katherine Converse; daughter of Edmund C. Converse, the president of Bankers Trust.
This marriage, too, ended unhappily when Katherine left Strong, took their two
daughters, and divorced him in 1920.3
In 1909, Strong’s other good friend and neighbor from Englewood, Thomas
Lamont, resigned as vice president of the Bankers Trust to become vice president of the
First National Bank. Strong succeeded him as vice president of Bankers Trust, working
directly under his new Father-in-law. When Converse retired, Strong became the
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president of Bankers Trust in January of 1914. By this time the company had merged
with Mercantile Trust Company, and Manhattan Trust Company, making it the second
largest trust company in the country. The position would last only ten months, as Strong
resigned from his post as president of Bankers Trust, as well as from the myriad other
business affiliations he had formed, like trustee of Seamen’s Bank for Savings (which his
great-grandfather helped found), and the boards of directors of two other trust companies,
and more than a dozen railroad, public utility, and industrial corporations. He left all this,
October of 1914 to accept the title of governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.4

Below is a copy of the original telegram received from John Skelton Williams,
Comptroller of the Currency, to Pierre Jay, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, authorizing the Bank to commence business on
November 16, 1914.5
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Benjamin Strong kept a hand-written note, which he wrote to himself, in the top
desk drawer of his office at the New York Federal Reserve. It read:
To the governor of this bank:
Never forget that it was created to serve the employer and the working man,
the producer and the consumer, the importer and the exporter, the creditor
and the debtor; all in the interest of the country as a whole.6
In 1915 the country was enjoying liquidity and prosperity, thanks, mostly, to
WWI. During this high time, Strong formed the Open Market Investment Committee
[OMIC] that was comprised of representatives from district member Federal Reserve
banks.
To ensure a continued strengthening economy, Strong wisely informed them not to
bid against each other in the New York market for the limited supply of U.S. Treasury
paper that had become scarce since the start of the war. With the economy healthy, the
banks would be clamoring for more money to loan out. Strong also wanted the loan
processes to go through New York to make sure all the banks in the system had access to
a money market. Strong’s desire for control over the entire system began to take shape
early.
Strong was extremely outspoken about what he considered irresponsibility in
banking and investing. He had true disdain for shady stock speculators and viewed the
average American banker as a bottom-feeder and a vulture-like creature, picking at the
bones of the banks’ reserves during times when he felt discretion and patience better
suited the economy. He was considered by many to be a snob, and a new-money elitist.
The farm in Fishkill, New York was far behind him by this point in his life and career. In
6
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a letter to Adolph C. Miller, Strong released some of his venom toward small bankers,
and urged him to prepare for the worst:
Until experience has demonstrated the contrary, I fear we must calculate that
the American banker, by and large, will do in future emergencies just what he
has done on similar occasions in the past. He will gather up every dollar of
reserve money that he can lay his hands on and lock it up so tight that the
Reserve Banks will never get a hold of it until the crisis is past. I personally
saw that happen in the early 90s, 1907, and 1914. Frankly, our bankers are
more or less an unorganized mob.7
His views on his fellow reserve banks’ tactics were no less harsh in their criticism.
In 1922, Strong told a Harvard audience,
Practically all borrowing by member banks from the Reserve Banks is ex
post facto. The condition which gives rise to the need for borrowing had
already come into existence before the application to borrow from the
Reserve Bank was made. The banks make their loans first, and then hunt for
the money to fund them.8
Strong wished to head off stock speculators before they could “damage the
economy.” However, his theories only truncated the activities of the smaller investor.
Large firms and individuals of considerable wealth had no use for loans at the stock
speculation level. Smaller investors were obtaining credit for stock exchange investment,
and Strong was intent on watching them like a hawk. In this regard he said,
The best way to control unwise extension of credit at the stock exchange was
to push the discount rates at the other 11 district Feds a percentage point
higher than the rate in NY. The differential would suck money out of New
York to the countryside, forcing the New York banks to call their loans to
stock speculators, those being the shortest loans, and the easiest to cancel.9
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His goal, to keep an eye on these investors was important to him, but he still had to
balance his disdain for speculators with his main objective of furthering American
business interests. Strong wrote to the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia:
That orgy [of stock speculation] will always be with us and if the Federal
Reserve System is to be run solely with the view of regulating stock
speculation instead of being devoted to the interests of industry and
commerce of the country, then its policy will degenerate simply to regulating
the affairs of gamblers.10

Almost immediately after the formation of the Federal Reserve System, and his
appointment as Governor of the New York branch, Strong was single-minded in his
efforts to expand the American banking system overseas. He sought to reform the
currency and bring as many banks as he could into the system to acquire as much gold
reserve as possible and to develop a major international money market in New York.11
He indicated how important this undertaking was to him in a letter he wrote in January of
1917, to Charles S. Hamlin, a member of the Federal Reserve Board:
If I live and keep my health, you will see our bank in a close and
important relationship with all the great central banks of Europe where such
relationships can be of value, and it is one of the matters which had been
uppermost in my mind ever since we started our organization. When that part
of the work is done maybe I will retire and grow potatoes.12
Years later, in 1927, Strong even joined a representative from J.P. Morgan and visited
Mussolini to convince him that to keep the Lira strong, he had to make the Bank of Italy
separate from the Finance Ministry. Mussolini failed to heed their suggestion.13
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For this herculean task of networking all the central banks of Europe with the
Federal Reserve, Strong knew he could not just take on the old guard of ancient European
financial centers head-on. Instead he promoted cooperation with international monetary
institutions. Thus, in February of 1916, with the Great War raging, he sailed to Europe to
negotiate with the leaders of the most powerful banks on the continent. His focus was on
the Bank of France and the Bank of England. He met with financial leaders from both
Paris and London and interviewed the men who ran the banks.
His work with the French proved to be fruitless, as their noted conservatism mired
definite agreements. However, the British were much more accepting of Strong’s ideas
and motives and he achieved much more material results with the Bank of England. In his
dealings and meetings with bank officials, on March 18th Strong met the man he would
have an association with for many years to come; Montagu Norman.
Strong presented Norman with a letter of introduction and recommendation from
James Brown, Montagu Norman’s former partner in the New York investment bank and
trading company, Brown Brothers and Company.14 That evening they dined alone in
Norman’s house and began forging the relationship that influenced the monetary histories
of both their countries.
By March 30th Strong and the representatives of the Bank of England had drafted
the Memorandum of Conversations between the Governors of the bank of England and
the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Strong reported the contents of
the memorandum to the reserve board upon his return to the States in April. The
memorandum began: “Confidentially and tentatively agreed upon for submission and
ratification by the respective institutions, with a view to be put into operation after the
14

Chandler, 258.

10

conclusion of the war.” It seemed unusual that the war was a non-stop conflagration at
that point, and the Bank of England and the New York Federal Reserve Bank were
making deals pending its conclusion. However, no one seemed to make note of this. The
memorandum contained 11 points:
1.) The Federal Reserve Bank of New York to act for itself and such of the other
eleven Reserve Banks as might elect to join the account.
2.) The Federal Reserve Bank of New York to maintain an account with the Bank of
England; but because of the law permitting the Federal Reserve Bank to receive
deposits from only their own members, and the United States Government, any
accounts with it would have to be in the form of earmarked15 gold.
3.) The Bank of England, to purchase on request prime sterling bills16 for the account
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and these bills to meet “eligibility”
requirements.
4.) The accounts, respectively, to be kept free of charges and commissions except for
out-of-pocket expenses.
5.) “It is hoped that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will eventually reach an
arrangement on similar lines with the Bank of France.”17
6.) No announcement, directly or indirectly, to be made regarding the contents of this
memorandum without the explicit consent of both institutions.
The other five points dealt with interest rates, earmarking gold, shipment of gold,
exchange of information, and cancellation provisions.18
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On April 26, 1916 the directors of the New York branch approved Strong’s
proposal. His plea for approval from the Federal Reserve Board was cut short because in
early June, Strong was diagnosed with tuberculosis of the lungs, and his doctor ordered
him to the thin air of Colorado for a year of rest and recuperation. Robert H. Treman was
appointed deputy governor in his absence, but Strong continued his pressure on the Board
for approval from the healthier air of the Rocky Mountains of Colorado19
On August 29th the Board tentatively approved the agreement with the provision
that no business would commence until after the war. But the Board set off a bitter
controversy between itself and the directors of the New York branch by immediately
violating the sixth provision of the agreement.
Officials of the New York branch, including Strong, found out about the final
approval in the newspapers. The Board sent the notification to chairman, Pierre Jay, in an
envelope marked, “Confidential,” disregarding the New York board, and Jay was on
vacation. The press got wind of the approval, printed it, and the board of the New York
branch was left out of the loop, completely. The Federal Reserve Board revealed its
autonomy and fullness of power with this act.
However, all was forgiven when the Bank of England agreed to ratify the
agreement and the Bank of France followed in February of 1917, with the war still
raging. This relationship with both European banks was unprecedented, and Strong’s
vision for “our bank” to become an international powerhouse with the cooperation of the
central banks of Europe, began.20
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Montagu Norman worked with Benjamin Strong on almost every deal the New
York Federal Reserve made with the Bank of England. The two men became such good
friends that they would vacation together at Bar Harbor, Maine and the South of France.
Steady flows of letters over years of collaboration kept their banking and personal
relationships taut and up to date.
Norman came from a family of bankers. Both his mother and father came from
prominent British banking families. He prepped at Eton, failed out of King’s College
after a year, and went to work at his father’s banking firm, Martin’s Bank, in 1882. He
journeyed to America and worked at his grandfather’s firm, Brown, Shipley and
Company in New York. For reasons unknown he traveled across the United States and
back, said to be learning about the American financial system, and then he returned to
Brown, Shipley and Company in 1898. Two years later he was made a partner.
Never married and quite foppish, Norman did not look the part of a banking mogul,
and before his experience in the Boer War he never did care for competition and was a
lonely and isolated individual. In the war he was placed in charge of a unit whose duty
was to hunt down Boer commandos. It was during this time where he found a sense of
adventure, enthusiasm, confidence, and the killer instinct he never knew existed in him.
He found who he was in war. He wrote to his parents, “I feel a different person now…
One looks ahead with something of dismay to the time when one will again have to settle
down to civilized life.”21 So, instead of civilized life, he returned to the banking industry.
A few years later he returned to England and was elected as the director of the
Bank of England in 1907. By 1918 he was the deputy governor, and in 1920 he became
governor. The traditional practice at the time was that the governorship of the Bank of
21 21
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England was rotated after two years. Norman, unaffected, served for twenty-four years in
succession.22
The United States and Brown, Shipley and Company have a long and storied
history together. J.P. Morgan Company began as George Peabody and Company, which
began in 1814 as Peabody and Riggs, in Georgetown, District of Columbia, dealing in
dry goods and operators of the Georgetown Slave Market. In 1815 they moved to
Baltimore to be closer to the supply of both dry goods and slaves. From there, Peabody’s
business through importing and exporting began to flourish in London. So he then
established the firm of George Peabody and Company in London. He was able to make
this seamless entry into the London business scene with the help of his British friend in
Baltimore, Alexander Brown. Alexander Brown possessed his already established firm in
Liverpool called Brown Brothers, and operated Alex Brown and Son out of Baltimore.
Back in 1801 he founded Brown, Shipley and Company, which remains to this day as the
oldest banking house in the United States; presently operating as Brown Brothers
Harriman, of which Prescott Bush (Father of former president George H.W. Bush, and
grandfather of the more recent former president George W. Bush) was a partner.23
During WWI, Benjamin Strong’s good friend, and fellow Morgan man, Henry P.
Davidson also traveled to England when Strong was there, meeting with Montague
Norman to hammer out the Memorandum of Conversations between the Governors of the
bank of England and the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Davidson
represented the great interests of the J.P. Morgan Company in the overseas war effort.
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J. P. Morgan adroitly used these long-standing ties with the British investment banks, his
emissary, Davidson, and his former “lieutenant,” Strong, to get the “House of Morgan
named as the sole purchasing agent in the United States, for the duration of the war, for
war material for both Britain and France.”24
After WWI, the League of Nations required a certain aloofness from U.S. banking
and business interests. But Strong had made his intentions very clear about financing
reconstruction programs for allied countries after the war. After the armistice of
November 11, 1918, Strong wrote to Montagu Norman, “There is no doubt that much of
the world’s happiness in the future will depend upon the relations now being established
between your country and ours.” The Bank of England and the Federal Reserve began
drawing the plans for the design of the world’s new economic landscape.25
Since Norman was not only unbound by the restrictions of the League of Nations,
many of Norman’s associates were on the League’s Financial Committee for relief,
reconstruction, and stabilization. The League was one of his principal channels for
floating loans to beleaguered countries through any central bank he wished. Since Strong
and the New York Federal Reserve represented the world’s greatest economic power, and
the largest monetary gold stock in the world, it was the largest potential source of
international loans, and the two men collaborated despite both U.S. and global political
restrictions.
To Strong and Norman, the United States and British post-war governments were
dominating them with monetary policy intervention, and they did not believe either
government had their best interests in mind. So the two men worked together through
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central banking, in the face of government reprisal, and succeeded by using loopholes in
the charter of the League of Nations.26
This was one of the catalysts that sparked the friendship and association of Strong
and Norman, which in turn formed a banking coalition between the United States and
England that would influence the entire economies of both countries, and even the
world’s. The whole time, the two men conducted their business while continuing to
thumb their noses at their own political leaders.
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